"I've Always Done It This Way and Nothing Has Ever Happened!": Safety Begins with the Way We Work

In the workplace, there are obvious risks, easily recognizable, and risks that instead become almost invisible because they are part of everyday life. A piece of equipment used every day, a procedure carried out hundreds of times, a habitual route, a gesture repeated so many times it becomes automatic. It is precisely in these situations that one of the main obstacles to safety can emerge: habit. One of the most recurring phrases when trying to correct an unsafe behavior is: “I’ve always done it this way and nothing has ever happened.” Apparently it seems like a justification; in reality, it is an alarm bell. The fact that a behavior has not caused an accident in the past does not mean that behavior is safe or that an accident cannot occur: it simply means that, up to that moment, the consequences have not materialized. Workplace safety should not be built on the basis of what has happened up to yesterday, but on the ability to prevent what could happen tomorrow.

This article stems from a simple but often overlooked conviction: safety does not begin with grand declarations, with signs hung on walls or with written and forgotten procedures. Safety begins with the way we work every day, with the gestures we repeat, with the decisions we make when no one is watching, with the habits that consolidate over time. And it is precisely there that the most insidious risk nests: the one we no longer see, because we consider it normal.

Experience Is a Resource, but It Can Become a Trap

Experience undoubtedly represents an important value. A worker who has been performing the same role for many years knows their environment, knows what the operational difficulties are, recognizes abnormal situations and often develops a practical ability that cannot be acquired through theory alone. Experience allows one to anticipate problems, find quick solutions, distinguish what is urgent from what can wait. In many companies, it is precisely the experienced workers who train the younger ones, pass on know-how, and maintain the quality of work.

However, experience does not automatically make one immune to risk. On the contrary, in certain conditions it can produce a particularly dangerous phenomenon: the normalization of risk. When a person has been carrying out a particular activity for years without suffering negative consequences, they can progressively convince themselves that that way of operating is correct. The reasoning becomes: “I’ve always done it this way and nothing has ever happened, why should it happen today?” The problem is that risk does not work this way. A dangerous behavior can be repeated several times without causing an accident and still remain a dangerous behavior. The absence of an accident in the past is not a measure of safety. It is only a statistical figure, often random, that says nothing about the probability of the event occurring next time.

In psychology, this mechanism is linked to several cognitive biases.

– There is the confirmation bias: we tend to notice and remember what confirms our beliefs, ignoring or minimizing contrary signals.
– There is the normality effect: the more familiar a situation is, the safer it seems to us, even when it is not.
– There is the induction fallacy: “it has always gone well, so it will go well this time too.”
– There is the survivor bias: we see those who made it through, not those who had an accident or an occupational disease, because those stories often do not circulate or are removed.

All of this builds a distorted perception of risk, which is at the root of very many avoidable accidents.

When Wrong Behavior Becomes the Norm

One of the most complex aspects of workplace safety concerns precisely those behaviors that, with the passing of time, end up being perceived as normal. Let us think, for example, of a worker who uses a piece of equipment without a specific guard because they believe that guard slows down the work. Or of someone who habitually crosses an area not intended for pedestrian traffic because it is the fastest route. Or again, of someone who manually lifts a load adopting an incorrect posture because they “have always done it this way.” At first, these actions may be recognized as incorrect behaviors. After months or years, however, they can become an integral part of the way of working. The wrong behavior is no longer perceived as a deviation from the procedure… it becomes the procedure! And it is precisely at this point that risk can become particularly difficult to identify, not because it has disappeared, but because people have stopped perceiving it as such.

This phenomenon is known as “normalization of deviance.” It often arises gradually and silently. One day, to go faster, a check is skipped. The next day, that check seems superfluous. After a week, nobody remembers it anymore. After a month, whoever performs it is considered slow or impractical. The deviation becomes institutionalized, enters the routines, is passed on to new hires as if it were correct practice. At that point, the official procedure becomes a formal document, while the real procedure is another. And the distance between the two is often where accidents occur.

Safety is therefore not just a matter of written rules. It is a matter of daily behavior, perception, culture. If the company culture rewards speed at any cost, if someone who stops to comply with a procedure is looked upon with annoyance, if managers turn a blind eye because “it has always gone well,” then no procedure will be sufficient. The most important rule is not the one written in the manual, but the one actually practiced in the departments, on the building sites, in the offices, in the warehouses, in the laboratories.

Procedures Are Not Enough If They Do Not Become Behaviors

Safety procedures are indispensable. They serve to define the correct steps, to reduce variability, to protect workers, to demonstrate that the organization has identified the risks and adopted prevention measures. But a well-written procedure is not automatically a well-applied procedure. Between the document and the behavior stands the person, with their habits, pressures, motivations, fears, and convictions.

For this reason, effective safety does not limit itself to “writing” the rules. It translates them into practice, makes them understandable, adapts them to the context, verifies them in the field, updates them when conditions change. A procedure that nobody manages to follow because it is too complex, too slow, or unrealistic is a procedure that will be circumvented. And every circumvention, even a small one, is a step toward the normalization of risk.

The point is not to establish whether a procedure is “convenient” or “inconvenient.” The point is to understand why it is being circumvented. Sometimes adequate equipment is lacking. Sometimes work schedules are poorly calibrated. Sometimes training was done only once and then forgotten. Sometimes supervisors do not set an example. Sometimes the procedure was written by someone who has never set foot in that department. Correcting these aspects is far more effective than limiting oneself to verbally reprimanding those who make mistakes.

The Role of Risk Perception and Near Misses

Risk perception is subjective. Two people can find themselves in the same situation and evaluate the danger in completely different ways. Experience, training, age, role, emotional state, tiredness, the pressure of the moment all influence the way we see risk. Someone who has worked in an environment for years can become accustomed to noises, vibrations, substances, high temperatures, confined spaces, repetitive movements. Habit reduces the sensation of danger, but does not reduce real danger.

This is where near misses come into play. These are events that have not produced harm but could have. A foot wrongly placed, a fall avoided, a tool that slips, a load that sways, a machine that stops just in time. Often they are dismissed with an “it went fine,” without further consequences. Yet near misses are a mine of information. They tell us where the system is breaking down, which behaviors are dangerous, which protections are missing, which conditions are changing. An organization that learns from near misses is an organization that prevents real accidents. An organization that ignores them is simply waiting for chance to stop being favorable.

The phrase “nothing has ever happened” is often uttered precisely after a near miss. But that “nothing” is in reality an extremely strong signal. It means that the risk has manifested, that the barrier held by a hair’s breadth, that next time it might not hold. Recognizing and reporting near misses should be normal, not exceptional. And for this to happen, people must feel safe in doing so: they must not fear punishment, humiliation, or repercussions on their career. Reporting must be seen as a contribution to safety, not as an admission of guilt.

Human Factors: Haste, Fatigue, Productive Pressure

Safety does not depend only on individual will. It also depends on the conditions in which one works. Haste is one of the most powerful enemies of safety. When deadlines are tight, when production increases, when staff is lacking, when every minute is measured, it is easy for the shortcut to become the norm. “I’ll do it the quick way for now,” “it’s just this once,” “then I’ll go back to doing it properly.” But repeated exceptions become habits, and habits become culture.

Fatigue also plays an enormous role. Long shifts, night work, intense rhythms, insufficient breaks, psychological stress reduce attention, working memory, the ability to recognize danger signals. A tired worker is not a negligent worker: they are a worker with reduced cognitive resources. Safety must take this into account, by organizing sustainable rotations, guaranteeing breaks, alternating tasks, avoiding excessive loads. One cannot demand infinite attention from a body and a mind that have physiological limits.

Productive pressure is another critical factor. When the implicit message is “safety is important, but production is urgent,” people quickly learn which priority is actually rewarded. If a department head asks for speed and then, after an accident, says things should have been done differently, the message is confused. Consistency between words and actions is fundamental. Workers observe what managers do, not just what they say. If the manager wears protective equipment, respects the procedures, stops when there is an anomaly, then safety becomes credible. If they do not, no training will be able to compensate. Setting a good example is fundamental.

Safety Culture and Leadership

Safety culture is the set of values, beliefs, unwritten norms, and behaviors that characterize an organization with respect to safety. It is not what is written in the company policy. It is what actually happens when nobody is watching. It is the way safety is talked about during a meeting. It is the reaction in the face of an error. It is the willingness to stop work when conditions are not safe. It is the ability to listen to whoever signals a problem.

Leadership is the engine of this culture. A leader is not only someone who gives orders, but someone who creates conditions. A good leader knows that safety is not a cost, but an investment. They know that an accident has human, social, and economic consequences. They know that sustainable productivity cannot do without health and safety. They know that the true performance indicator is not only the number of pieces produced, but also the number of near misses reported, participation in training, the quality of behavioral observations, the climate of trust.

The effective leader does not limit themselves to sanctioning whoever makes a mistake. They seek to understand why the error occurred. They distinguish between deliberate violation, involuntary error, lack of training, inadequate procedure, organizational problem. Each cause requires a different response. Punishing always and in all circumstances produces omertà, fear, concealment. It does not produce safety. True safety requires transparency, learning, continuous improvement.

Training, Practical Drilling, and Involvement

Training is a pillar of prevention, but not all training is effective. A two-hour lecture, once a year, with slides full of rules and statistics, hardly changes behaviors. Effective training is participatory, practical, contextualized. It starts from real risks, from the situations workers encounter every day, from the most frequent errors, from near misses. It involves workers in the search for solutions. It uses concrete examples, simulations, discussions, case studies. It verifies not only what has been learned, but what has been applied.

Practical drilling is equally important. Knowing that a procedure exists is not enough. One must know how to carry it out, even under pressure, even when something goes wrong. Skills are maintained through practice, not through memory. For this reason, it is useful to provide for periodic updates, on-the-job coaching, field checks, and moments of exchange. Experienced workers can become trainers, but they must in turn be trained to transmit not only the “how it is done,” but also the “why it is done.” Otherwise they risk passing on bad habits along with precious skills.

The involvement of workers is decisive. Who knows the work better than the person who performs it? Often, the simplest and most effective solutions are born precisely from those on the shop floor. Listening to workers does not mean delegating responsibility for safety. It means enriching decisions with information that is not visible from above. It means increasing the sense of belonging and motivation. It means creating a culture in which safety is not “imposed,” but “built together.”

Practical Tools to Prevent the Normalization of Risk

To counter the normalization of risk, concrete tools are needed, not only good intentions. Here are some possible interventions.

1. Behavioral safety observations. This is not about spying or punishing, but about observing with a constructive spirit. A trained observer accompanies a worker, notes safe and at-risk behaviors, and then discusses them respectfully. The objective is to reinforce correct behaviors and correct dangerous ones before they cause harm.

2. Checklists and periodic checks. Checklists help to avoid taking the familiar for granted. They can concern equipment, environments, procedures, PPE, signage, escape routes. They must be simple, clear, and up to date. They must not become a bureaucratic exercise, but a tool for dialogue.

3. Toolbox meetings and daily briefings. Five minutes at the start of the shift to talk about specific risks, planned activities, weather conditions, changes, and recent near misses. These are brief but powerful moments, because they keep attention high and make it possible to flag critical points.

4. Safety walks and inspections with managers. Walking through workplaces, talking with people, observing real conditions. An entire day is not needed. Even thirty well-spent minutes can bring to light problems that have been ignored for months.

5. Analysis of accidents and near misses. Every event must be analyzed methodically, not looking for someone to blame but for the causes. The causes are often multiple: organizational, technical, human, procedural. Only by acting on all of them can recurrence be prevented.

6. Anonymous or protected reporting. If people fear reprisals, they do not report. A clear, accessible, and non-punitive reporting system increases knowledge of risks and allows early intervention.

7. Recognition of safe behaviors. Rewarding those who stop, who report, who propose improvements, who help colleagues. Safety must not be only a set of prohibitions, but also a valued practice.

Correcting Without Blaming

One of the most frequent errors is turning safety into a hunt for the guilty party. When something happens, the first question is often “who is responsible?” But this question rarely improves safety. The right question is: “what allowed this to happen?” A human error is almost always the consequence of latent conditions: a confusing procedure, insufficient training, inadequate instrumentation, an excessive workload, deficient communication, deferred maintenance.

Correcting without blaming does not mean absolving those who deliberately violate the rules. It means distinguishing between those who make mistakes because they do not know, those who make mistakes because they cannot do otherwise, those who make mistakes because the system induces them to err, and those who consciously choose not to comply with the rules. Only after this distinction can one decide on the most appropriate intervention: training, coaching, modification of the procedure, maintenance, sanction, or support.

The phrase “I’ve always done it this way and nothing has ever happened” must be addressed with both listening and firmness. Listening, because behind it there is often real experience, an operational difficulty, a request for understanding. Firmness, because one cannot accept that habit becomes a justification for exposing oneself and others to an avoidable risk. One can respond: “I understand that you’ve always done it this way. That is precisely why it is important to talk about it. The fact that nothing has happened does not mean that nothing can happen. Let us look together at how we might do this differently, in a way that is safer and more sustainable.”

Concrete Examples

A particularly significant example happened to me during an inspection at the deli counter of a supermarket. As part of the verification of compliance with operational procedures, I had asked a worker to show me how the cleaning of the meat slicer was carried out at the end of the shift.

The worker, with extreme naturalness and without showing any particular concern, switched the machine on, set the blade rotating, and began to clean it using a simple piece of cardboard, held between two fingers and rested directly on the moving blade.

Faced with that way of operating, I asked him whether, in his opinion, this constituted safe behavior. The response was immediate and very significant: “I’ve been doing it this way for over thirty years and nothing has ever happened.”

The worker further explained that, in his experience, that way of doing it allowed him to carry out the cleaning more quickly and to finish the activity sooner.

At that point I told him that the absence of accidents does not prove that the behavior is safe. He looked at me slightly surprised, but that simple statement made him reflect and a constructive exchange began. In a few minutes, we had arrived at the conclusion that there is a safe procedure for cleaning the blade and that it is not worth risking in order to be “faster.”

It is precisely in situations like this that the concept of normalization of risk becomes particularly evident. The behavior was not perceived by the worker as dangerous, despite constituting a concrete and obvious exposure to risk. On the contrary, the thirty years spent without consequences had reinforced the conviction that that way of doing things was safe, correct, and even more efficient.

This episode demonstrates how experience, if not accompanied by constant attention to safety, can transform itself into a kind of “proof” confirming an incorrect behavior: I’ve done it for years, nothing has ever happened, so I can keep on doing it. But the absence of an accident does not prove that the behavior is safe; it simply proves that, up to that moment, the harmful event has not occurred.

In these cases, the task of those who deal with safety should not be limited to telling the worker that they are “making a mistake.” It is necessary to explain why that behavior is risky, helping them recognize a danger that, precisely because of habit, they have stopped perceiving as such. Awareness-raising and direct exchange thus become fundamental tools for interrupting consolidated behaviors and bringing attention back to the real risk.

The objective is not to call the worker’s experience into question, but to transform it into a resource: thirty years of experience should make it possible to work better and in greater safety, not become the justification for continuing to work in a way that needlessly exposes one to risk.

Safety Begins with the Way We Work

Safety is not an event separate from work. It is not an annual meeting, a sign, a form to sign. It is the way we organize activities, design spaces, acquire equipment, plan rotations, communicate priorities, manage errors. It is the way we treat people. It is the way we react when someone says “I don’t feel safe.” It is the way we decide whether to stop or press on.

“I’ve always done it this way and nothing has ever happened” is a phrase that should prompt reflection, not close the discussion. It should push one to ask: how many times have we been lucky? How many times was the risk present but did not turn into harm? How many times did we let our guard down without realizing it? How many times did new hires learn from us not only what is right, but also what is wrong?

Prevention is not a set of prohibitions. It is a collective competence. It is the ability to recognize risk even when it is familiar. It is the willingness to change consolidated habits. It is the readiness to stop, to ask, to report, to improve. It is the awareness that safety is never definitive, but must be built every day.

In conclusion, safety begins with the way we work. It begins with a gesture, a choice, a question. It begins when we stop saying “it has always gone fine” and start saying “how can we do this better?” It begins when experience becomes a resource for improving, not an excuse for not changing. It begins when every person, from top to bottom, feels responsible not only for their own safety but also for that of others. Only in this way can the phrase “nothing has ever happened” be replaced by a truer and safer phrase: “We work well, every day, so that tomorrow may still be a day without accidents.”